Dissertation
Why do some revolutions result in confiscation and others do not? And what are the consequences of revolutionary confiscation for the political economy of post-revolutionary states? While the scholarship identifies various post-revolutionary policies, practices, and transformations — especially around democratization, democratic backsliding, and economic development — the causes and outcomes of revolutionary confiscation have been overlooked. This dissertation argues that the causes behind the practice can be explained by the extent to which pre-revolutionary conditions intensified ideology as the driver of the revolution, especially in contexts with patrimonial, neo-patrimonial, and colonial legacies. Revolutionary confiscation also carries significant political-economic and societal consequences: it increases the capacity of post-revolutionary states to entrench electoral authoritarianism, raises corruption by shaping patron-client networks built on nationalized natural resources, and decreases economic freedom through socialist economic policy. Ultimately, it promotes state dominance over society by deteriorating civil liberties and weakening civil society.
Works in Progress
A Neo-Prebendal Polity: Iran's Political Economy Under the Islamic Republic. Proposes a theory of neo-prebendal politics to explain the poor performance of development policy in Iran — a more complex, advanced form of prebendalism based on the appropriation of public resources for the private interests of political-economic elites, exerted systematically through bankocracy, an uncompetitive market society, and undeserved legalized rights. In this rent-seeking polity, parastatal goods are prioritized over public ones, and collective rent-seeking is embedded within the state's political economy. The project proposes "neo-prebendal class" as an alternative to the standard middle-class concept, arguing that neo-prebendal morality and the celebritization of politics sustain the state's rentier ideology and paralyze developmental policy.
Corruption and Democracy Under the Islamic Republic. Examines the impact of corruption on electoral trust, voter turnout, institutional trust, satisfaction with the political system, and democracy in Iran — contributing to the quantitative understanding of the relationship between corruption and democratization in the country.